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INTRODUCTION

I

n recent years, commercial arbitration has become the instrument of choice for participants in international trade
seeking “a workable mechanism for swift resolution of day–to–
day disputes.”1 The reason for this development lies in more
than the fact that arbitration presents parties with a viable alternative to the typically expensive, lengthy, and complex litigation proceedings.2 Since arbitration is always the result of an
agreement, the parties also benefit from wide latitude in setting
the ground rules of the decision–making process. As a result,
the dispute resolution process, as well as the arbitrator’s decision, can be tailored to the wishes of both parties, increasing
their confidence in the impartiality of the decision–maker and
of the expected outcome. Secondly, arbitrators are generally
experts in the field and thus inspire a great deal of confidence
as effective and impartial decision–makers. Finally, as a result
of the widespread accession of United Nations (“UN”) member
states to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “New York Convention”)3, in most
cases international arbitral awards are much easier to enforce
across international jurisdictional lines.
Realizing that arbitration brought relief to overcrowded judicial dockets, the Supreme Court of the United States (“Supreme
Court”) has embraced arbitration as a valid alternative to judicial resolution of disputes, but not “without regard to the wishes
of the contracting parties.”4 Rather, in offering its endorsement,
the Supreme Court has relied upon principles of contract law to
prevent state and federal interference with the arbitral process.5
However arbitral awards still need judicial sanction in order to

1. See Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928 (2nd Cir. 1983).
2. THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTIONS: MELTING
THE LANCES AND DISMOUNTING THE STEEDS 1, 4, 134 (1989).
3. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, Jun.10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (effective in the United
States on December 29, 1970).
4. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman-Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 56–57
(1995); Volt Information Sciences v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Jr.
University, 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989).
5. See Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 57.
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be enforced.6 The latter step of the process can be a source of
extensive dispute in cases involving enforcement of foreign
awards.
One of the most important issues that has recently arisen in
reviewing arbitral awards is to what extent parties can rely on
freedom of contract to expand the scope of judicial review beyond the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”),
which incorporates the New York Convention.7 As a result of
the lack of guidance from the Supreme Court, the circuits which
have considered the issue have arrived at diametrically opposed
conclusions.8 However, these decisions share a common methodology in arriving at their results. All circuits have recognized
that any resolution of this proposition necessitates a balancing
act between two sets of competing interests: the integrity of the
judicial or arbitral institution, pitted against the freedom of
contracting parties to tailor a private dispute resolution system
to their particular needs. This Note, in weighing the same concerns, will attempt to illustrate why several circuits that have
allowed for expanded review of arbitral awards, have reached
the correct result. In support of this argument, this Note will
6. See Edward C. Okeke, Judicial Review of Foreign Arbitral Awards:
Bane, Boon or Boondogle? 10 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 29, (1997) (stating that the
“role of the judiciary in arbitral process admits of no controversy; this, perhaps, accounts for the paucity of decisional law on the subject”).
7. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1994). The scope of this Note is restricted to the
issue of expansion of judicial review. While many of the same arguments can
be advanced in support of restricting judicial review, a discussion of that issue
necessarily implicates several additional problems, which are not addressed
here. One commentator has correctly noted that “as a matter of logic, it is
difficult to see why parties may agree to expand judicial review but not to
eliminate it. Assuming an arms–length transaction, there is no reason why
the parties should not be allowed to put themselves entirely at the mercy of
private arbitrators. ... If the strong federal policy in favor of arbitration requires enforcement of private agreements to expand judicial review, it would
seem to apply a fortiori to agreements restricting or eliminating judicial review.” James B. Hamlin, Contractual Alteration of the Scope of Judicial Review – The US Experience, 15 J. INT’L ARB. 47, 56 (1998).
8. In favor of expansion of review, see LaPine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera
Corp., 130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997); Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995). Opposed to expansion of
review, see Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2001); Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chicago Sun–Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501
(7th Cir. 1991), and, most recently, LaPine Technology Corp., v. Kyocera
Corp., 2003 WL 22025130 (9th Cir. 2003).
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discuss both the public policy considerations at play in this debate, and the available Supreme Court and circuit court decisions.
Part I of this Note discusses the FAA and the New York Convention, and the public policy considerations they encompass.
Part II will present a synopsis of the decisions in which federal
appellate courts have addressed expansion of judicial review in
the domestic setting, and the justifications they offered in
reaching their respective outcomes. First, this part will present
the views of the circuits that have adopted the institutional integrity viewpoint and concluded that expansion of judicial review is intolerable based on its impact on the role of the courts
in resolving disputes. Second, this paper will present a synopsis of the decisions where courts focusing on freedom of contract
principles have chosen to defer to the wishes of the parties and
enforce agreements for expanded review. Part III will provide a
brief summary of the conclusions reached by some foreign jurisdictions in addressing the issue of expanded judicial review.
Part IV will then present an analysis of the arguments advanced by the institutional integrity and freedom of contract
advocates, address the public policy interests raised by the issue of expanded review, and discuss their application to the issue of federal court jurisdiction. Finally, this Note will examine
the international implications of expanded review and offer
some conclusions as to the likely future developments regarding
expanded judicial review of arbitral awards.
I. STATUTORY BACKGROUND: THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
AND THE NEW YORK CONVENTION
In discussing the issue of expanded review of arbitral awards,
an analysis of the underlying statutes is a sine qua non prerequisite of any complete examination. Such an analysis is warranted for several reasons. First, the substantive law in this
area is statutory. Secondly, the legislative, rather than common law, origin of the current law on arbitration is of particular
significance because it provides evidence of the difference in
objectives pursued by the Federal Arbitration Act and the New
York Convention. While the FAA and New York Convention
were both enacted to eliminate judicial reluctance toward arbitration by guaranteeing the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate, the New York Convention also had an additional objec-
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tive, namely the unification of the world–wide enforcement
standards for international arbitral awards.9 Since the New
York Convention takes precedence when applied to the enforcement of international arbitral awards, U.S. courts must
keep in mind both the objectives of the FAA and the New York
Convention.
A. The Federal Arbitration Act
1. Legislative History
The Federal Arbitration Act was enacted in 1925, and it constituted the entire arbitration law of the U.S. until the ratification of the New York Convention.10 Chapter I still constitutes
the law affecting U.S. domestic arbitration, i.e. arbitration cases
involving U.S. interstate commerce, where the arbitration was
conducted under domestic law, or the award was made in the
U.S.11 As discussed in detail below, the New York Convention
governs in arbitrations deemed to be “foreign” pursuant to the
statute, and Chapter I of the FAA acts merely as a gap–filler.
2. Public Policy Considerations
One of the main motivations of Congress in enacting the FAA
was to reverse the long–standing reluctance of U.S. courts to
accept arbitration as a legitimate form of dispute resolution,
and to rectify the failure of state statutes to mandate enforcement of arbitration agreements.12 It was also enacted “to make
arbitration a more viable option to parties weary of the ever–
increasing cost and delays of litigation.”13 Thus, there is ample
9. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974).
10. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (1994). Note that for the
purposes of this part, the designation “FAA” will refer strictly to Sections 1–16
of Title IX of the U.S. Code, rather than the current format of Title IX, which
incorporates the New York Convention (in Chapter II) and the Inter–
American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (in Chapter
III). For a full discussion of the reasons for this distinction, see infra Part
IV.C.
11. See THOMAS H. OEHMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 3A:04 (rev’d ed.
2002).
12. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265,
266 (1995); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14–16 (1984).
13. See H.R. Rep No. 96, 68th Congress, 1st Sess. (1924).
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evidence, that the FAA reflected a heavy pro–arbitration bias
on the part of Congress from its very inception.14 Furthermore,
it is also clear that this bias applied with particular force in the
realm of international commerce, a point addressed in detail
later in this Note.15
However, the FAA accomplished more than simply establishing a universally recognized right to arbitration. The Act
amounts to “a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state
substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.”16 Furthermore, the strong pro–arbitration language in the statute was
interpreted by the Supreme Court to evince congressional intent that “as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the
scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”17 The Supreme Court’s decision in Allied–Bruce, in which
the court upheld the position that the FAA extends to the full
reach of Congress’ powers under the Commerce Clause, best
illustrates the reason for this very expansive and highly deferential view toward arbitration.18
In defining the nature of arbitration under the FAA, the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that arbitration is a
creature of contract.19 In recognizing the contractual nature of
arbitration, the Supreme Court noted that the wishes of the
parties must be respected even if at times the terms of the underlying contract may work against some of the specific benefits

14. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460
U.S. 1 (1983).
15. See H.R. Rep. No. 1181, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970); See also Allied–
Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 265.
16. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24.
17. Id.
18. See Allied–Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 274. The Court reached this
conclusion by examining the language of the statute (“involving” commerce),
and finding it to be the functional equivalent of “affecting.” The Court continued by stating that when used in the phrase “affecting commerce,” this word
or its equivalents evince “a congressional intent to exercise its Commerce
Clause power to the full.” Id.
19. See AT&T Tech., Inc. v. Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S.
643, 648 (1986); see also United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S.
564, 570 (1960).
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which arbitration grants.20 In the Court’s opinion, “the basic
objective in this area is not to resolve disputes in the quickest
manner possible, no matter what the parties’ wishes, ... but to
ensure that commercial arbitration agreements, like other contracts, are enforced according to their terms.
B. The New York Convention
Identical concerns regarding the viability of arbitration and
the enforcement of arbitral agreements and awards eventually
surfaced in the international context. In these cases, however,
matters were further complicated by the reluctance of parties to
entrust the resolution of disputes to the judicial systems of their
business partners’ home countries because of potential bias and
lack of familiarity with foreign judicial systems.21 However, a
fair and effective system of dispute resolution became a paramount need with increased international economic expansion
and globalization of the world economies.
In order to achieve this end, several international conventions were drafted during the twentieth century. The first such
document was the Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses of
1923, followed by the Geneva Convention of 1927. While these
treaties were laudable first attempts at uniform rules of enforcement, they still contained serious deficiencies, such as provisions placing the burden of proof on the party seeking enforcement of the arbitral award.22 Furthermore, the Convention
20. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 947 (1995). See
also Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 57 (holding that federal policy favors enforcement of arbitration terms which the parties agreed to).
21. RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 1146
(4th ed. 1999) (citing Nelson, Alternatives to Litigations of International Disputes, 23 INT’L LAW 187 (1989)).
22. The two treaties referenced above failed to effectively meet the demands of international commerce, and were thus unsuitable for the purposes
desired by private actors. For example, the Geneva Convention in Article I
required signatory countries applying local rules to enforce awards made in
other signatory countries. However, the Geneva Convention did not apply to
the enforcement of awards made in non–signatory countries, thus impeding
the international enforceability of arbitral awards. The New York Convention
cured this defect in Article I(1) by extending its application to all awards foreign to the jurisdiction where enforcement of the award was sought. However, the reservation in Article I(3) of the New York Convention allows countries to reserve the right, upon ratification of the Convention, to only apply
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of 1927 lacked the expected impact on international dispute settlement because neither the United States nor the Soviet Union
ratified it.23 The New York Convention followed in 1958, bringing some much–needed improvements. To date, one hundred
and thirty–three countries, including the United States, have
ratified the New York Convention.24 The New York Convention
was designed to make enforcement of arbitral awards almost
automatic; to a large extent, it has accomplished its goal.
1. Legislative History
The treaties in place before the New York Convention did not
effectively mandate enforcement at the international level. In
1953, in order to remedy this situation, the International
Chamber of Commerce submitted to the Secretary General of
the UN a report and a preliminary draft convention to replace
the previous treaties.25 The proposal was reviewed and revised
by an ad–hoc committee of the UN Economic and Social Council. Additional revisions were made pursuant to the comments
submitted by member governments of the UN, non–member
governments and interested international organizations. Finally, a conference on the subject was convened in New York.
Working parties established at this conference made further
amendment proposals, and the conference resulted in the Convention in its current form. The U.S. Congress ratified the New

the Convention to awards rendered “in the territory of another Contracting
State.” Given the widespread ratification of the New York Convention, however, this point has become largely moot. Also, the Geneva Convention contained the requirement of double exequatur, which restricted a party from
seeking enforcement of the award in another jurisdiction until the award was
confirmed in the country of origin. For a full discussion of the problem of double exequatur see Kenneth R. Davis, Unconventional Wisdom: A New Look at
Articles V and VII of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 54–55 (2002).
23. See PHILIPPE FOUCHARD ET AL., FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN ON
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 122 (Emmanuel Gaillard & John
Savage eds., 1999).
24. An up–to–date list can be found on the United Nations Commission for
International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) web site, which is regularly updated
as new information becomes available, see http://www.uncitral.org/en-index.ht
m (last visited Sept. 25, 2003).
25. Report and Preliminary Draft Convention, U.N.Doc. E/2704 and Corr.
(1958).
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York Convention in 1970, and included it in the FAA in the
same year by enacting Chapter II of Title Nine of the U.S.
Code.26
2. Public Policy Considerations
The purpose of the New York Convention was “to encourage
the recognition and enforcement of commercial arbitration
agreements in international contracts, and to unify the standards by which agreements to arbitrate are observed and arbitral awards are enforced in the signatory countries.”27 The tenets of the Convention constituted a major improvement over
existing treaties.
Chapter II of Title Nine implements the New York Convention, and provides as follows: Section 201 provides that the New
York Convention “shall be enforced in United States courts in
accordance with this chapter.”28 Section 203, in contrast with
Chapter I of the FAA,29 confers subject matter jurisdiction on
the federal courts for proceedings where parties seek enforcement or review of arbitral awards under the New York Convention.30 Section 207 adopts the grounds for refusal or deferral of
enforcement of awards from the Convention into the FAA.31 Finally, Section 208 establishes the relationship between the New
York Convention and the former parts of the FAA.32 Thus, pursuant to principles of statutory interpretation, in cases where
arbitral awards are sought to be enforced pursuant to the New
York Convention (FAA Chapter II) or the Inter–American Con26. H.R. Rep. No. 1181, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970).
27. See Scherk, 417 U.S. at 520 n15.
28. 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1994).
29. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (1994).
30. 9 U.S.C. § 203 (1994). In relevant part, this section provides that “An
action or proceeding falling under the Convention shall be deemed to arise
under the laws and treaties of the United States. The district courts of the
United States ... shall have original jurisdiction over such an action or proceeding, regardless of the amount in controversy.” See infra Part IV.C. for a
further discussion of the issue of jurisdiction.
31. Provides that “the court shall confirm the award unless it finds one of
the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement of the award
specified in the [New York] Convention.” 9 U.S.C. § 207 (1994).
32. “Chapter I applies to actions and proceedings brought under this chapter to the extent that chapter is not in conflict with this chapter or the Convention as ratified by the United States.” 9 U.S.C. § 208 (1994).
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vention on International Commercial Arbitration (FAA Chapter
III), Chapter I serves only to fill in the gaps.33
The New York Convention also contains some potentially inconvenient provisions, but, as the widespread ratification of the
Convention indicates, these provisions have not raised significant hurdles. Two potential problems arise from the reservations allowed to signatory states by Article I(3).34 First, the so–
called “reciprocity reservation” allows signatory states to declare that they will apply the Convention only to awards rendered in the territory of another contracting state.35 This reservation initially increased the degree of uncertainty regarding
the enforcement of arbitral awards rendered in non–signatory
countries. Given the widespread ratification of the Convention,
however, this restriction has become almost entirely moot.36
Secondly, the Convention allowed states to declare that they
would only apply the Convention to “differences arising out of
legal relationships, whether contractual or not, which are considered commercial under the national law of the State making
such declaration.”37 This provision subjected the enforceability
of foreign arbitral awards to a measure of domestic review in
the country where enforcement is sought, by subjecting these
awards to the domestic interpretation of the concept of “commerce.”
The most attractive feature of the Convention lies in Article
V, which lists the exclusive grounds for refusing recognition and
enforcement of arbitral awards. The grounds presented in Article V are generally very clear, and provide a valuable framework for actors in international commerce to structure their
agreement so as to avoid denial of enforcement. In relevant
part, Article V provides:

33. See THOMAS H. OEHMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 3A:04 (rev’d ed.
2002). (Referring to the principle of statutory interpretation stating that “the
specific controls the general.”).
34. The United States has ratified the Convention but has maintained both
reservations. See UNCITRAL web site at http://www.uncitral.org/en-index.ht
m for a complete list of reservations maintained by all signatory states.
35. See New York Convention Art. I(3), supra note 3.
36. See supra note 24.
37. See New York Convention Art. I(3), supra note 3.
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1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused...only if that party furnishes to the competent authority
where the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that:
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II
were, under the law applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law to
which the parties have subjected it, or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the
award was made; or
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not
given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or
of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to
present his case; or
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by
or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the
scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the
decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of the award
which contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be recognized and enforced; or
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement
of the parties, or failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration
took place; or
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties,
or has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, the
award was made.
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also
be refused if the competent authority in the country where
recognition and enforcement is sought finds that:
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of
settlement by arbitration under the law of that country; or
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be
contrary to the public policy of that country.

The importance of the Article V provisions lies in their precision and their ability to restrict judicial interference to a limited
number of scenarios. Thus, paragraph one addresses potential
grounds for review with regard to procedural problems. In al-
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lowing the losing party minimal recourse against enforcement
of awards, this paragraph limits the grounds for review to a
very narrow, defined set of circumstances. Paragraph two, especially its latter provision, seems to expand the scope of possibilities for invalidation, and works against the precision of the
previous paragraph. This dichotomy is not as strong as it might
appear, however. In the United States, for instance, in keeping
with the pro–enforcement bias of the Convention, the language
of paragraph (2)(b) was interpreted to apply only to cases jeopardizing “the forum state’s most basic notions of morality and
justice,” a very rigorous standard.38
In contrast to the preceding two Geneva conventions, under
the New York Convention the party advocating denial of enforcement bears the burden of proof.39 Furthermore, the language of the Convention does not require that enforcement be
denied if sufficient proof is presented. Rather, it is permissive,
granting the reviewing judge leeway to proceed with enforcement in spite of the proof presented.40 Neither the New York
Convention nor the FAA contemplate situations in which parties contract to expand the scope of judicial review of arbitral
awards. Because of this omission the national courts have addressed this problem with mixed results, as the following section will illustrate. Unfortunately, as a result of the lack of
statutory guidance or Supreme Court direction, the outcomes
have not been as uniform in the U.S. domestic arena as one
might hope. The federal appellate courts have reached different
results based on differing levels of emphasis placed on institutional integrity and the parties’ freedom of contract.

38. See Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Société Generale de
L’Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2nd Cir. 1974).
39. See supra Part I.B. (On the Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses of
1923 and the Geneva Convention of 1927).
40. See New York Convention, supra note 3, art. V (The chapeau of Article
V(1) provides that “Recognition and enforcement may be refused, at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to
the competent authority where recognition and enforcement is sought,
proof....” (emphasis added)).
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II. FEDERAL APPELLATE COURT DECISIONS AND UNDERLYING
CONSIDERATIONS
The tension that permeates the issue of expanded review of
arbitral awards is evident from the sheer volume of scholarly
articles that address the topic.41 Furthermore, the disparity in
the decisions on this issue among the various districts speaks
loudly as to the validity of both points of view in this debate.
Given the lack of Supreme Court guidance, reasonable minds
may disagree as to the legality of such expanded review. Nevertheless, this Note will contend that contractual expansion of
judicial review is not only warranted, but indeed mandated, by
the nature of the arbitral process and its underlying policy objectives. The following sections will illustrate why the only outcome consistent with long–standing public policy in the field of
arbitration is the one allowing such expanded review.
Several circuits have ruled on the issue of the legality of expanded judicial review of domestic arbitral awards in recent
years, and have arrived at opposing conclusions.42 The decisions
of the various circuits have polarized around two main trains of
thought. The first is illustrated by decisions of the Seventh and
Tenth Circuits, which have refused to allow expanded judicial
review out of concern for the integrity of the judicial system.43
41. See, e.g., Tom Cullinan, Contracting for an Expanding Scope of Judicial Review in Arbitration Agreements, 51 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1998); Kenneth
M. Curtin, An Examination of Contractual Expansion and Limitation of Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 337 (2000);
Kenneth R. Davis, Unconventional Wisdom: A New Look at Articles V and VII
of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 43, 44 (2002); Kenneth R. Davis, When Ignorance of
the Law is No Excuse; Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 45 BUFF. L. REV.
49 (1997); James B. Hamlin, Contractual Alteration of the Scope of Judicial
Review — The US Experience, 15 J. OF INT’L ARB. 47 (1998); Alan S. Rau, “Arbitrability” and Judicial Review: A Brief Rejoinder, 13 WORLD ARB &
MEDIATION REP. 71 (2002); Hans Smit, Contractual Modification of the Scope
of Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 147 (1997); Kevin
A. Sullivan, The Problems of Permitting Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards under the Federal Arbitration Act, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 509
(2002); Stephen P. Younger, Agreements to Expand the Scope of Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 63 ALB. L. REV. 241 (1999).
42. See supra note 8.
43. Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2001); Chicago
Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chicago Sun–Times, 935 F.2d 1501 (7th Cir.
1991).
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The second viewpoint is exemplified by decisions of the Fifth
and Ninth Circuits, which have taken a freedom of contract approach and have chosen to move away from a restrictive interpretation of statutory language, allowing expanded review of
arbitration agreements.44
In illustrating the arguments made by the various circuits,
this paper will dissect the LaPine I decision of the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals in late 1997.45 This case provides an excellent
example of the polarization of the various circuits, because the
decision of the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California (the “Northern District of California”) in
La Pine Technology Corporation v. Kyocera Corporation46 aptly
presents the arguments against expanded review, while the
decision of the LaPine I panel illustrates the freedom of contract
approach.
A. The Institutional Integrity Model
1. Underlying Considerations
According to the institutional integrity viewpoint, expanded
judicial review is impermissible because it intrudes into the
court’s role as designated by statute. The arguments raised by
the scholars and the various courts in supporting this view,
once cleansed of rhetorical discourse and fact–specific twists,
can be summarized as follows:
Institutional integrity advocates consider the role of the
courts in reviewing arbitral awards immutable and strictly defined. They argue that Congress, by passing Title Nine of the
U.S. Code, has provided a clear set of boundaries for the courts
in reviewing both domestic and international arbitral awards.
Therefore, if parties were allowed to ignore the statutes and
draft their own rules as to judicial review, the role of the courts
and the arbitration process would be negatively impacted in
several significant ways.

44. LaPine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir.
1997); Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 64 F.3d
993 (5th Cir. 1995).
45. LaPine Tech., 130 F.3d 884.
46. LaPine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 909 F.Supp 697 (N.D. Cal.
1995).
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First, the courts would be asked to perform a review based on
a standard agreed to by the parties, with which the reviewing
courts may or may not be familiar. Thus, requiring the courts
to apply differing standards of review in every dispute would
undermine the expected predictability of outcomes in award
enforcement proceedings. Such a scenario, it is argued, would
give rise to concerns regarding potential injustice due to the
differing interpretations which the various courts might give to
standards of review fashioned by agreement between the parties to the dispute.47 This concern was aptly expressed by Judge
Kozinski in his concurring opinion in the LaPine I decision.48
Secondly, the advantageous nature of arbitration would be
damaged if the courts were to allow the parties to set the
boundaries of judicial review by agreement.49 In performing this
expanded review, courts would unnecessarily extend the duration, scope and expense of reaching a resolution to the dispute
presented. Such a process would diminish the qualities which
make arbitration of disputes attractive, and significantly reduce
the value of arbitration as an effective means of extra–judicial
dispute resolution.
Finally, the argument presented holds that expanded review
would violate specific statutory provisions of the FAA.50 Such a
course of action would impermissibly substitute the will of parties to the arbitration in place of the will of the legislature, as
expressed in the FAA. Specifically, the institutional integrity
advocates hold that the grounds for review mentioned in the
FAA are the exclusive grounds available to a reviewing court in
examining arbitral awards, and that congressional intent in
this matter was to specifically preclude any review under differing, more expansive, standards. These arguments were adopted
by several federal appellate courts and were discussed in detail
by the Northern District of California opinion in the LaPine
case.51
47. Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 543
(1995) (Stevens J., dissenting).
48. LaPine Tech., 130 F.3d at 891.
49. Hans Smit, Contractual Modification of the Scope of Judicial Review of
Arbitral Awards, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 147, 151 (1997).
50. Konicki v. Oak Brook Racquet Club, Inc., 441 N.E.2d 1333 (Ill App. Ct.
1982).
51. LaPine Tech., 909 F.Supp 697.
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2. The Northern District of California Decision in
LaPine Tech. v. Kyocera
LaPine Technology Corporation (“LaPine”) was formed in
1984 in order to design, market and share computer disk
drives.52 Since it did not have the necessary facilities to manufacture these drives, LaPine entered into an agreement with
Prudential Trade (a partnership the general partner of which
was an affiliate of Prudential–Bache Trade Corporation) and
Kyocera Corporation (“Kyocera”).53 The contemplated transaction structure provided that Kyocera, acting as LaPine’s licensee, would manufacture the drives, and that financing for production would be provided by Prudential Trade.54 Subsequent
agreements were completed in 1985, outlining the structure of
the transaction: LaPine would order the drives from Kyocera
pursuant to a negotiated quantity and delivery schedule. Another subsidiary of Prudential Trade would then purchase the
product from Kyocera and resell it at a markup to Prudential
Trade, which would finally sell it to LaPine on credit.
In January 1986, LaPine, Kyocera and Prudential Trade,
through its subsidiary KK PB Trade Corporation, (“KK Trade”),
agreed to certain actions to be taken by the parties in 1986.55
However, later that year Kyocera experienced severe production
problems. LaPine was in turn plagued by management problems, and failed to make payments to Prudential Trade, but
still requested that Prudential Trade make payments to Kyocera for product delivered by Kyocera. Kyocera requested assurances that it would be paid for goods manufactured and
shipped by it.56 Due to the impasse, a reorganization of LaPine
became imperative in order to continue the production and sale
of the disk drives, and several formulae were contemplated by
the parties.57
The agreed upon solution provided for a “merger” by which
LaPine would become the wholly owned subsidiary of a newly
formed LaPine Holding Company (“LaPine Holding”). Two
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 699.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 700.
Id.
Id.
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thirds of LaPine Holding’s voting stock would be owned by Prudential Trade and one third by Kyocera, in exchange for additional capital contributions by Prudential Trade and Kyocera.58
An agreement detailing these arrangements was executed by all
the parties on December 18, 1996.59 This Definitive Agreement
provided that the parties bound themselves to present executed
copies of various other, more specific, agreements, such as the
Amended Trading Agreement, by the closing date.60 However,
after signing the Definitive Agreement, Kyocera declined to sign
the Amended Trading Agreement, which provided for a direct
sale of the products from Kyocera to LaPine, without the intervening sales to KK Trade and Prudential Trade, and notified its
business partners of its refusal.61 On December 29, 1986, the
closing date, counsel for LaPine and Prudential Trade notified
Kyocera of its breach of the Definitive Agreement by reason of
its failure to execute the Amended Trading Agreement.62
In May 1987, LaPine sued in the Northern District of California, in an attempt to compel Kyocera to continue supplying
drives under the terms of the Definitive Agreement. Pursuant
to the section of the Definitive Agreement regarding dispute
resolution, Kyocera moved to compel arbitration, and the district court granted the motion in September 2, 1987.63 The dispute was submitted to arbitration before a panel of the International Chamber of Commerce, which found in favor of LaPine.64
After the issuance of the arbitral award, La Pine moved to confirm the award under Chapter I of the FAA, the domestic arbi-

58. Id.
59. The agreement (known as the Definitive Agreement) was executed by
all parties, including Kyocera, and then filed with the California Corporations
Commissioner in order to comply with California law regarding corporate
reorganizations. Id.
60. Id. at 701.
61. Kyocera’s counsel advised other parties that Kyocera would not sign
the Amended Trading Agreement at a meeting on December 17 and 18, 1986.
Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. Section 8.10(b) of the Definitive Agreement provided that “the arbitration shall be conducted in accordance with the Rules of Conciliation and
Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) and the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. sections 1 et seq.” Id.
64. LaPine Tech., 909 F.Supp at 698.
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tration statute.65 In turn Kyocera moved to vacate, modify and
correct the award. The crux of the dispute was contained in
Section 8.10(d) of the Definitive Agreement, stating the role of
the arbitrators and that of the federal court of first instance:
The arbitrators shall issue a written award which shall state
the bases of the award and include detailed findings of fact
and conclusions of law. The United States District Court for
the Northern District of California may enter judgment upon
any award, either by confirming the award or by vacating,
modifying or correcting the award. The Court shall vacate,
modify or correct any award: (i) based upon any of the grounds
referred to in the Federal Arbitration Act, (ii) where the arbitrator’s findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence, or (iii) where the arbitrator’s conclusions of law are erroneous.66

The significance of this paragraph as the bone of contention
between these parties is plainly visible from the text of the
agreement, as subsections (ii) and (iii) include grounds of review
above and beyond those customary under the FAA. Section (ii)
explicitly asks the federal district court to review the arbitral
award in light of the evidence presented. Such review can pose
significant problems, since arbitration proceedings rarely produce a record of the proceedings.67 Furthermore, the evidentiary and disclosure rules of arbitral processes are tailored to
the needs of the parties, and constitute a far cry from the rigors
of litigation.68 Thus, a review of the factual support of the arbitral award invites extensive debate over the veracity and comprehensiveness of the facts presented. Moreover, the “supported by substantial evidence” standard agreed to by the parties is sufficiently vague to allow for a wide range of approaches
by the reviewing court. Section (iii) invites judicial review of
the arbitrator’s conclusions of law. This process can also be difficult and likely to give rise to extensive debate, because in most
65. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (1994). It is unclear to this author why LaPine did
not opt to seek enforcement of the award under the New York Convention,
since the award in this case clearly qualified as “foreign” within the meaning
of the statute.
66. Id.
67. RICHARD GARNETT ET AL., A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 14 (2000).
68. Id.
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cases arbitrators do not render opinions detailing their interpretation and application of the law.69 Furthermore, arbitrators
are not always obligated to follow the law very closely in rendering a decision, but rather are granted wide powers to decide the
dispute before them in accordance with general principles of
fairness, equity and justice.70 Thus, the combined language of
these provisions in fact almost mandated de novo review by the
Northern District of California.
In deciding the case, the court discussed several issues, but
acknowledged that the central issue of the case was the validity
of the scope of review clause. In support of its pro–enforcement
position, Kyocera made several arguments based on previous
decisions on the subject. However, the Northern District of
California was not persuaded, and chose to follow the language
of Seventh Circuit opinion in Chicago Typographical, and to
take a restrictive institutional integrity approach to the case.71
In Chicago Typographical, the union representing the composing–room employees of both the Chicago Sun–Times (the
“Sun–Times”) and the Chicago Tribune (the “Tribune”) had
signed a collective bargaining agreement with the Tribune.72 In
reliance on a clause in its own agreement with the union which
entitled the Sun–Times to any concessions the union granted
the Tribune, the Sun–Times subsequently changed some of the
terms and conditions of employment in its composing room.73
The matter was submitted to arbitration by the union, with a
mixed result.74 In early 1990 the union filed suit in federal district court challenging the arbitral award, based on Section 301
of the Taft–Hartley Act, creating federal jurisdiction over suits
to enforce labor contracts.75 The district court upheld the arbitral award, and the union appealed to the Seventh Circuit.
Judge Posner began his discussion on behalf of the Seventh
Circuit by stating that the role of the courts was not “to review
the soundness of arbitration awards, [because] agreement to
69. See Chicago Typographical, 935 F.2d at 1506.
70. See GARNETT ET AL., supra note 67, at 26.
71. Chicago Typographical, 935 F.2d 1501.
72. Id. at 1503.
73. Id.
74. Id. The arbitrator found that some of the changes were authorized by
the “most favored nation” clause, and that some were not. Id.
75. Id.
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submit a dispute ... to arbitration is a contractual commitment
to abide by the arbitrator’s interpretation.”76 Thus, the court
recognized the possibility that parties could resort to an appellate arbitration panel to review an arbitrator’s award.77 But the
Seventh Circuit then went on to categorically deny the possibility of federal judicial review of that award, by stating: “they [the
parties] cannot contract for judicial review of that award: federal jurisdiction cannot be created by contract.”78 In support of
its holding, the opinion went on to state that the court was not
allowed to “substitute its own interpretation even if convinced
that the arbitrator’s interpretation was not only wrong, but
plainly wrong.”79 Judge Posner further explained that in–depth
scrutiny of arbitrator opinions would be detrimental, because it
might discourage arbitrators from writing opinions at all.80 The
court reasoned that while arbitrators were not required to write
opinions, the practice of doing so was very beneficial, as “writing disciplines thought,” and therefore the courts should not
“create disincentives for their doing so.”81 This, however, is as
far as the Seventh Circuit opinion went in, undoubtedly
obliquely, speaking to the issue of expanded review of arbitral
awards.
First, it is important to note that the entire discussion mentioned above is dicta, as expanded judicial review was not an
issue before the Seventh Circuit in that instance, and therefore
the precedential value of the opinion is limited.82 As the LaPine
I panel later correctly noted, there was no indication that the
parties had bestowed appellate jurisdiction upon the Seventh
Circuit, nor had they asked the reviewing court to utilize some
unfamiliar standard of review.83 Second, in cases involving international arbitration awards, the federal courts undoubtedly
have subject matter jurisdiction by explicit statutory authoriza-

76. Id. at 1504–05.
77. Id. at 1505.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1506.
81. Id.
82. Tom Cullinan, Contracting for An Expanded Scope of Judicial Review
in Arbitration Agreements, 51 VAND. L. REV. 395, 407 (1998).
83. LaPine Tech., 130 F.3d at 889–90.
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tion.84 Third, the Chicago Typographical decision failed to address the issue squarely, since neither of the parties in this case
asked the court to expand the scope of its involvement. Nevertheless, relying on the reasoning in the Seventh Circuit dicta,
the Northern District of California held that where federal jurisdiction was clearly established, and the guidelines for review
were provided by statute, the extent of review could not be altered by contractual understandings among the parties.
Since the Northern District of California decision in LaPine,
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has also addressed the issue
of expanded review of arbitral awards in Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Company, and has also refused to uphold expanded review,
becoming the first federal court of appeals to explicitly do so.85
In 1998 the Bowens filed suit against Amoco in tort and breach
of contract. Amoco’s pipeline, which extended over the Bowens’
property pursuant to an easement agreement, had been found
to be leaking by an investigation of the Oklahoma Corporate
Commission. Amoco moved to compel arbitration pursuant to
the easement agreement which had been executed by both parties’ predecessors in interest. The Bowens and Amoco agreed to
arbitration, provided that the scope of judicial review of the arbitral award would be enlarged.86 Specifically, the reviewing
court had the power to review the award “on the grounds that
the award was not supported by the evidence.”87 The arbitrator
found for the Bowens, and they filed a motion for confirmation
of the award.88 Amoco simultaneously filed a motion to vacate
the award, as well as a notice of appeal of the arbitration award
pursuant to the modified arbitration rules.89 The lower court
refused to apply the expanded review of the arbitration clause,
and confirmed the award.90
In a unanimous decision, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the lower court.91 The appellate court offered only a curt

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See infra, Part IV.C.
Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 930.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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nod to the decisions of the Fourth,92 Fifth and Ninth Circuits,
and chose to disregard their holdings.93 The Tenth Circuit disagreed with these courts, stating that the Supreme Court language they invoked did not specifically address the issue of parties’ interference with the judicial process. Specifically, the
Tenth Circuit looked to the underlying policy of the FAA, and
held that the widespread support for arbitration was a result of
the fact that it provided an expeditious and cheap method of
dispute resolution. Thus, the opinion stressed the speed and
cost–effectiveness of arbitration and found that these attributes
must trump any agreement of the parties which would diminish
them. As mentioned above, however, the Ninth Circuit subsequently reversed the decision of the Northern District of California in LaPine I, and instead emphasized the freedom of contract approach.
B. The Freedom of Contract Model
1. Underlying Considerations
Freedom of contract proponents view this dilemma of expanded review from a slightly different perspective. In their
opinion, the foremost feature which attracts parties to arbitration as an option for effective dispute resolution is not the expeditiousness and cost–effectiveness of the process, but rather the
ability to have the dispute resolved within a framework which
the parties themselves can establish by agreement, and the
ability to have their wishes enforced by the courts. Thus, although speed of resolution and significant reduction in expenses
are significant advantages, they lose their luster if imposed
paternalistically by a rigid judicial system and an inflexible legislature. In other words, substituting the formalistic, procedure–laden system of in–court litigation with another structure
of dispute resolution which, while somewhat cheaper and faster,
still takes the decision–making ability away from the parties
with regard to key issues, is contrary to the fundamental pre92. In an unpublished opinion, the Fourth Circuit court joined the Fifth
Circuit, concluding that the district court should have applied the expanded
standard of review agreed to by the parties. See Syncor Int’l Corp. v. McLeland, 120 F.3d 262, (4th Cir. 1997).
93. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 933.
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cepts of arbitration. After all, arbitration, along with other alternative dispute resolution methods, was intended to allow
parties to circumvent the strictures of litigation by designing a
resolution process fitted to their specific needs.94 While the judicial system can not be circumvented entirely, because awards
still need judicial sanction in order to be enforced, the exposure
to potential unexpected results at the review level was minimized by the legislature through enactment of the FAA, and by
the international community by enactment of the New York
Convention. However, proponents of the freedom of contract
model argue that there is no indication that these documents
were intended to thwart the wishes of the parties to arbitration
to do so.
2. The Ninth Circuit Decision in LaPine I95
Subsequent to the district court decision, Kyocera appealed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The
Ninth Circuit reached a decision on the matter in December
1997.96 The three–judge panel was divided on the outcome of
the case, with each of the judges on the panel submitting an
opinion. The opinions of Judges Fernandez, Kozinski and
Mayer will be discussed in turn.
The majority opinion97, written by Judge Fernandez, identified the major issue of the case: “Is federal court review of an
arbitration agreement necessarily limited to the grounds set
forth in the FAA or can the court apply greater scrutiny, if the
parties have so agreed?”98 The majority agreed with Kyocera in
finding that parties could, by agreement, stipulate to expand
judicial review of arbitration decisions.99 In reaching this conclusion, the court departed from the rule it had announced in
Todd Shipyards, which held that in the absence of contractual
terms with respect to judicial review, a federal court could vacate or modify arbitral awards only if the respective award ex94. Kenneth R. Davis, When Ignorance of the Law is No Excuse: Judicial
Review of Arbitration Awards, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 49, 51 (1997).
95. See LaPine Tech., 130 F.3d 884.
96. Id.
97. As will be pointed out, the deciding vote of Judge Kozinski offered only
reserved support to the majority position.
98. LaPine Tech., 130 F.3d at 887.
99. Id. at 888.
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hibited a manifest disregard for the law, was completely irrational, or otherwise fell within one of the grounds enumerated
in 9 U.S.C. §§ 10 or 11.100
The deciding factor in the Ninth Circuit’s opinion was the
Supreme Court’s Volt Info. Sciences decision.101 In Volt, in an
opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court had
reiterated “the FAA’s primary purpose of ensuring that private
agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their
terms.”102 In deferring to congressional intent, the Supreme
Court held that the FAA does not prevent enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate under rules different from those set out
in the FAA.103 In further defining the approach which courts
should adopt in reviewing arbitration agreements, the Court
stated that “arbitration under the Act is a matter of consent,
not coercion, and parties are generally free to structure their
arbitration agreements as they see fit.”104
Judge Fernandez then addressed, but explicitly declined to
follow, the Seventh Circuit’s Chicago Typographical opinion,
arguing that the Seventh Circuit had not explained “what had
evoked that pronouncement, nor did it further explain the reasoning behind it.”105 The majority explained that the Chicago
Typographical opinion had not indicated that the parties in the
100. See Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1060
(9th Cir. 1991). Beside the “manifest disregard” and “completely irrational”
standard, the FAA also allows vacatur of an award procured by corruption,
fraud or undue means, where there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators, where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone hearings, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy, and, finally, where the arbitrators exceeded their powers or used them so imperfectly so that a mutual,
final and definite award was not rendered on the subject matter. See Federal
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1924). Furthermore, the FAA allows federal
courts to modify or correct an award where there was evident material miscalculation or an evident material mistake in a description of a person or thing,
where the arbitrators awarded on matter not submitted to them, or where the
award is imperfect in of form not affecting the controversy. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 11 (1924).
101. See Volt Information Sciences v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford
Jr. University, 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
102. Id. at 478.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 479.
105. La Pine Tech., 130 F. 3d at 889–90.
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action had intended to bestow “appellate jurisdiction” on that
court, nor had that opinion indicated that the parties had asked
the court to utilize some “exotic” standard of review.106 In light
of these considerations, the Ninth Circuit opted to treat the
“cryptic assertion” of the Seventh Circuit as dicta.107 Instead,
the majority chose to follow the prescription of the Supreme
Court, holding that there is an “established principle that the
FAA is a regulation of commerce rather than a limitation on or
conferral of federal court jurisdiction.”108
In reaching its decision, the LaPine I majority also relied on
the precedent set by the Fifth Circuit in Gateway Technologies
v. MCI Telecommunications Corp.109 In Gateway the Fifth Circuit had held that the provisions of the FAA could be superseded by terms of the contract because the contractual provisions arose from the agreement of the parties.110 MCI had won a
bid for a contract with the Virginia Department of Corrections,
which it then subcontracted to Gateway.111 The contract with
Gateway called for dispute resolution by arbitration, stipulating, however, that “errors of law shall be subject to appeal.”112
Pursuant to a dispute over the design of the system, the contract with Gateway was terminated, and arbitral proceedings
ensued. The arbitrator found MCI to have breached the contract. Gateway moved to confirm the award, and MCI moved
to vacate the district court decision confirming the award.113
The Fifth Circuit also relied on the Supreme Court decision in
Volt in approving of the enlarged scope of judicial review embodied in the parties’ agreement.114 The court held that “because these parties contractually agreed to expand judicial review, their contractual provision supplements the FAA’s default
standard of review and allows for de novo review of issues of
law.”115 The court also explicitly stated that it would uphold ex106.
107.
108.
109.
1995).
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id.
See Allied–Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 269.
See Gateway Tech., Inc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir.,
Id. at 996–97.
Id.
Id. (discussing Art. 9 of the contract between Gateway and MCI).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 997.
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panded judicial review even if doing so would in effect “sacrifice
the simplicity, informality and expedition of arbitration on the
altar of appellate review.”116 The Fifth Circuit concluded that
the intent of the parties trumps, because “federal arbitration
policy demands that the court conduct its review according to
the terms of the arbitration agreement.”117
Finally, in addressing the loss of efficiency argument with respect to enlarged judicial review, the Ninth Circuit cited arguments which the Southern District of New York had found to be
persuasive in a previous case.118 In Fils, the Southern District
had discussed the efficiency issue, and concluded that even with
the enlarged review the resulting inquiry is “far less searching
and time–consuming than a full trial” and therefore approved of
expanded judicial review of arbitral awards in spite of the loss
of speed and cost–effectiveness.119
The La Pine I dissent adopted and reiterated the arguments
of the Seventh Circuit in Chicago Typographical in refusing
expansion of judicial review.120 Judge Mayer’s opinion recognized that parties were free to contractually agree to the procedures to be followed during the arbitration process. However,
he insisted, the appellants had cited no authority explicitly authorizing them to dictate how an Article III court was to review
an arbitration decision.121 Consequently, if the parties wished
more expansive scrutiny than granted under the FAA, they
could agree to appellate review of an arbitration decision by
another arbitration panel.122 They could not, however, stipulate
by agreement to expanded judicial review of their initial arbitration award.123
Judge Kozinski, the third judge sitting on the LaPine I panel,
was somewhat reserved in his concurrence with the majority
opinion, and found the question presented was not one that

116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Fils et Cables D’Acier de Lens v. Midland Metals Corp., 584 F.Supp
240 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
119. Id. at 244.
120. LaPine Tech., 130 F.3d at 891.
121. Id..
122. Id.
123. Id..

File: DanMacro.doc

2003]

Created on: 10/19/2003 8:41 PM

FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS

Last Printed: 11/17/2003 5:36 PM

339

could elicit an easy answer.124 He accurately noted that the
quoted Supreme Court cases failed to address the specific issue
at the center of the dispute.125 His objection was specifically addressed to the “different work” which the federal courts could be
required to perform under the text of such an agreement for
expanded review, work that might not be authorized by Congress.126 Nevertheless, Judge Kozinski joined the majority opinion, because the standard of review stipulated by the parties’
agreement was identical to the one used by federal courts in
appeals from administrative agencies or bankruptcy court decisions.127 In the judge’s opinion, given the strong policy favoring
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate, Congress would probably approve of the court’s decision. And while this did not constitute “express congressional authorization ..., given the Arbitration Act’s policy, it’s probably enough.”128
Pursuant to the LaPine I decision, the case was remanded to
the Northern District of California.129 The Northern District
confirmed the award of the arbitration panel, and Kyocera Corporation appealed, without disputing the issue of expanded review. On re–appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment of
the lower court, as well as the award of damages.130 However, in
an interesting twist, a majority of the non–recused regular active judges of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently voted
to re–hear the case en banc, and pursuant to the rules of the

124. Id. (Kozinski J., concurring) (stating that he found the issue before the
court “closer than most”).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. In Judge Kozinski’s words:
Nevertheless I conclude that we must enforce the arbitration agreement according to its terms. The review ... is no different from that
performed by the district courts in appeals from administrative agencies and bankruptcy courts ... . I would call the case differently if the
agreement provided that the district judge would review the award
by flipping a coin or studying the entrails of a dead fowl.
Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Kyocera Corporation v. Prudential–Bache Trade Services, Inc. et. al.,
299 F.3d 769 (2002) [hereinafter LaPine II].
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court131 an order to that effect was entered by Chief Judge Mary
M. Schroeder.132 Prior to the en banc hearing the Ninth Circuit
received additional briefing on the issue of whether private parties may contractually bind a federal court to apply a less deferential standard of review than the standard specified in the
FAA.133 On August 29, 2003, the Ninth Circuit issued a decision, reversing the three–judge panel decision in LaPine I. Although Kyocera set forth over twenty–five grounds to vacate or
correct the decision of the arbitral panel, and explicitly declined
to address expanded review, the Ninth Circuit considered the
issue of expanded review as dispositive of the case. In raising
the issue sua sponte, the court held that Congress, through the
FAA, had provided the exclusive grounds of review of arbitral
decisions. The arguments raised by the Ninth Circuit in support of its reversal, are identical to those raised by Judge Posner in Chicago Typographical, and state that while parties may
dictate the rules regarding the arbitration proceedings themselves, they may not establish the ground rules of judicial review. Thus, the Ninth Circuit recently aligned itself with the
Seventh, Eighth and Tenth circuits in denying expanded review, without raising any new arguments in support of its position.
The ultimate outcome of the case is irrelevant for purposes of
this Note, because the arguments made by the majority in LaPine I remain just as valid, and until the Supreme Court addresses the issue, the problem remains unresolved. The outcome is of some importance to practitioners, however, because
the circuits have reached different conclusions on this issue,
and thus identical proceedings would yield different outcomes
depending on the circuit in which they were brought.
III. RESPONSES OF FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS
The views of foreign jurisdictions on the issue of expanded judicial review do not necessarily carry a lot of weight in U.S.
131. Circuit Rule 35–3, available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/Docu
ments.nsf/FRAP+and+ Circuit+Rules?OpenView.htm.
132. Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Services, Inc. et al., 314 F.3d
1003 (2002).
133. Kyocera Corporation v. Prudential–Bache Trade Services, Inc., et al.,
2003 WL 22025130, at 5 (9th Cir. 2003).
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courts. However, it is important to observe how various countries, some with a legal system very similar to our own, have
chosen to resolve this issue, given the above mentioned goal of
the Convention, namely uniformity in enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards.134
A. UNCITRAL Model Law
Before delving into an analysis of the various legislative
frameworks of other major actors in the field of international
commercial arbitration, it is important to take a brief look at
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law’s
(UNCITRAL) Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (the “Model Law”).135 The reason for this preliminary examination is that the Model Law has served as a blueprint for
many of the legislative acts which created the modern national
arbitration frameworks, and in some cases, the Model Law has
simply been adopted by the respective nations.136 Article 5 reflects one of the most important objectives of the Model Law,
limiting the interference of national courts in the arbitral process, by specifically holding that courts could intervene only in
specific circumstances.137 The language of Article 5 seems to
unequivocally prohibit interference by the courts in situations
not specifically listed in its provisions, and also seems to exclude any residual powers which the courts may have had.138
Further clarifying the standards of review, Articles 34 and 36 of
the Model Law provide the list of criteria for review of arbitral
determinations, largely based on Article V of the New York
Convention.139 The intent to specifically curtail the involvement
of the courts is further confirmed by the legislative history of
134. See Scherk, 417 U.S. at 520 n.15.
135. UNCITRAL Model Law on Int’l Commercial Arbitration, UNICTRAL
Model Law, available at http://www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm. Thus far 39
countries have enacted laws based on the UNCITRAL Model. Id.
136. Vikram Raghavan, Heightened Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards:
Perspectives from the UNCITRAL Model Law and the English Arbitration Act
of 1996 on Some US Developments, 15 J. INT’L ARB. 103, 123 (1998).
137. See Model Law, supra note 135, art. 5.
138. Id. (stating “In matters governed by this Law, no court shall intervene
except where so provided in this Law.”).
139. See Model Law, supra note 135, art. 34 and 36 (Art. 34 states that an
application to set aside is the only recourse against an arbitral award and Art.
36 lists the exclusive grounds for refusing recognition or enforcement).
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Articles 34 and 36, which reveals that after extensive debate of
additional proposals, the drafters agreed to limit the grounds of
review to only those mentioned in the New York Convention.140
Thus, it would seem that under the UNCITRAL Model Law
contractually expanded judicial review would not be available,
given the very restrictive language of Articles 5, 34 and 36.
However, the Model Law is not binding, rather it only constitutes a guide for national legislation, and one which has been
adopted by countries around the world with varying degrees of
alteration.141 One alternative to the Model Law is provided by
the English Arbitration Act of 1996.
B. United Kingdom
The United Kingdom (“U.K.”) is one of the foremost centers of
international commercial arbitration, and has a long–standing
tradition of accepting arbitration as a valid means of dispute
th
resolution, dating back to as early as the 17 century.142 The
current arbitration law framework in the U.K. was established
by the entry into force of the Arbitration Act of 1996 (the “Arbitration Act”).143 The Arbitration Act aligned the country’s legislation with the modern standards in arbitration law, and while
it did not derive from the UNCITRAL Model Law, the influences of the Model Law are certainly visible. The Arbitration
Act generally establishes the same regime for both domestic
and international awards, but maintains certain specific provisions pertaining solely to recognition and enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards.144 Specifically, Section 1 of the Arbitration Act
lays out the “founding principles” pertaining to the construction
of Part I of the law, and states that in matters covered by Part
I, the court should not intervene except as provided within the
Part.145 In this respect, Section 1 of the Arbitration Act strongly
140. See Raghavan, supra note 136, at 125–26 (citing HOWARD M.
HOLTZMANN & JOSEPH E. NEUHAUS, A GUIDE TO THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW
ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 912–15 (1989)).
141. Id at 125 n.87, 126 n.92 (discussing changes made by Australia, Singapore, New Zealand, Egypt, Hong Kong, etc.).
142. HANS SMIT & VRATISLAV PECHOTA, NATIONAL ARBITRATION LAWS, UK A–
1 (2002).
143. Id. at UK A–2.
144. Id.
145. Raghavan, supra note 136, at 131.
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resembles Article 5 of the Model Law. Article 103 of the Arbitration Act covers awards sought to be enforced pursuant to the
New York Convention.146 Under this section, recognition or enforcement of these awards may not be refused except in a specified number of cases, based largely on the grounds set forth by
the New York Convention, and which are considered to be exhaustive.147
However, one major departure from the Model Law is embodied in Section 69 of the Arbitration Act. This section allows the
parties to arbitration to bring an appeal on questions of law
arising from an arbitration award.148 If, however, the parties
agree otherwise, this right to appeal is precluded, and a challenge may be raised only under the grounds specifically listed in
Section 68 of the Arbitration Act.149 Thus, under English Law,
the parties to the arbitration can agree prior to the dispute
whether the English courts will have the power to review the
arbitral award on issues of law. In this respect, England’s Arbitration Act has parted in a significant way with the precepts of
the Model Law. Thus, nowadays England offers parties to arbitration the possibility to expand judicial review beyond the
grounds listed in the New York Convention, provided enforcement is not sought under the New York Convention, but rather
under Articles 68 and 69 of the Arbitration Act.
C. France
The host nation of the International Chamber of Commerce,
France, plays a leading role in the development and advancement of international commercial arbitration. Furthermore, the
French legal system tends to be very similar to the U.S. system
with respect to the approach to international arbitration. Like
the U.S., France shares a policy of favoring arbitration, has extensive case law on enforcement of arbitral awards, and gives
great deference to party autonomy in the arbitration process.150

146. Id. at 133.
147. Id.
148. James B. Hamlin, Contractual Alteration of the Scope of Judicial Review — The US Experience, 15 J. INT’L ARB. 46 (1998).
149. Id.
150. Laurence Franc, Contractual Modification of Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards: The French Position, 10 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 215, 216 (1999).
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However, unlike courts in the United States, French courts
have not thus far been asked to decide whether to give effect to
arbitration agreements expanding ulterior judicial review.151
In spite of this situation, scholars have argued that even if
presented with the issue, the French courts would most likely
decline enforcement of such an agreement.152 The main reason
for this assertion lies in the nature of the French provisions
governing judicial review of such awards. The Decree of 1980
reformed the provisions regarding French domestic arbitration
and became part of the New Code of Civil Procedure (“NCPC”)
through the addition of Articles 1442 to 1491.153 The Decree of
1981 completed the picture by adding Articles 1492 to 1507 to
the NCPC, provisions specifically applicable to international
arbitration.154 Overall, these reforms have had a positive impact
on French arbitration law. Since the enactment of the new
NCPC provisions, the Paris Court of Appeals has developed a
liberal stance toward arbitration agreements, arbitral procedure, the substance of awards made abroad, and towards the
removal of international arbitrations from the effects of choice
of law rules and national legal systems, within the limits of international public policy.155
Both decrees contain very specific provisions for setting aside
arbitral awards, listed in NCPC Articles 1484 and 1502 respectively, and make it abundantly clear that the setting aside of an
arbitral award is available only in those cases.156 Thus, should
parties invoke any other grounds,157 the reviewing court will
simply not take those grounds into consideration because, quite
151. Id. at 218.
152. Id.
153. Decree no. 80–354 of May 14, 1980, J.O., May 18, 1980; 1980 AM. REV.
INT’L ARB. 725.
154. Decree no. 81–500 of May 12, 1981, J.O., May 14, 1981; 1981 AM. REV.
INT’L ARB. 317.
155. See FOUCHARD ET AL., supra note 23, at 68.
156. Franc, supra note 150, at 216–17; FOUCHARD ET AL., supra note 23, at
916.
157. See Société GL Outillage c/ Soc. Stankoimport, CA de Paris 1e civ., July
10, 1992, REV. ARB. 1994, 142, note P. Level (Paris Court of Appeal refused to
take into account the lack of jurisdiction of the Paris court); Southern Pacific
Properties Ltd. c/ Republique Arabe d’Egypte, Cass. 1e civ., Jan. 6, 1987, REV.
ARB. 1987, 468 (Cour de Cassation held that the mission of the Court of Appeals was to examine the grounds enumerated in Article 1502 of the NCPC).

File: DanMacro.doc

2003]

Created on: 10/19/2003 8:41 PM

FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS

Last Printed: 11/17/2003 5:36 PM

345

literally, they are not “on the list.”158 Nevertheless, as mentioned above, this proposition has not yet been tested in the
context of a pre–dispute agreement to expand judicial review.159
However, a recent decision of the Cour de Cassation on a similar issue seems to indicate that should the situation arise, the
French courts would decline to grant the desired expanded review. In Soc. Buzicchelli Holding v. Hennion, the French high
court held that the freedom of contract of the parties does not
grant them the power to create a means of recourse, which is
not available under French law applicable to international
awards.160
D. Germany
The recent reform of the German Code of Civil Procedure
(“ZPO”) was long in the making since no major revisions of the
ZPO had been undertaken since 1879.161 The changes enacted
in 1997 reformed German arbitration law completely. The new
Book X of the ZPO is essentially based on the 1985 UNCITRAL
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, and does
not distinguish, in principle, between domestic and international arbitration.162 Unlike the Model Law, however, the new
law is not restricted to “commercial” arbitration, but instead
governs all arbitrations.163
Similar to the French NCPC, the German statute provides a
definite and exclusive list of grounds on which an award may be
challenged.164 Thus, in Germany as in France, expanded review
of arbitral decisions is probably not available even if parties had
contracted for it.

158. Franc, supra note 150, at 217.
159. Id.
160. Franc, supra note 150, at 218 (citing the Cour de Cassation decision in
Société Buzicchelli Holding c/ Hennion et autres, Cass. 1e civ., Apr. 6, 1994,
REV. ARB. 1995, 263, note P. Level).
161. FOUCHARD ET AL., supra note 23, at 75.
162. Id.
163. SMIT & PECHOTA, supra note 142, at GER A–2.
164. Id. at GER B(2)–15 (translation of ZPO Chapter VII, Sections 1059 (2)
and (3)).
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E. Belgium
In order to accommodate and encourage the development of
international arbitration in Belgium, in 1985 this country revised Article 1717 of its Code Judiciaire.165 The revision constitutes a major development in the area of international arbitration, due to its rather drastic character.166 Specifically, paragraph 4 of Article 1717 completely denies Belgian courts the
authority to review international awards where the parties are
non–Belgian, even if the situs of the arbitration was Belgium.167
As a result, non–Belgian parties to international arbitration can
no longer bring set–aside proceedings, even where there is clear
evidence that the arbitrator or the arbitral tribunal acted
fraudulently or ultra vires.168 This provision is clearly revolutionary, and has in effect turned Belgium into an “arbitration
nirvana” for those who are most interested in finality when
submitting disputes to arbitration.169
However, while the Code Judiciaire now precludes the use of
judicial review as a sword in setting aside a foreign award, it
still allows for its use as a shield to defend against enforcement.170 This situation raises the question of whether the New
York Convention is applicable to foreign awards not subject to
review at the seat of arbitration.171 It has been argued that such
awards have an “anational” character, and therefore the Convention does not apply.172 If that were the case, there would be
no reason why courts would refuse to implement the scope of
judicial review desired by the parties. The reason for the previous assertion is the fact that the Convention contemplates judi-

165. See Okeke, supra note 6, at 44.
166. Id.
167. Jay R. Sever, Comment, The Relaxation of Inarbitrability and Public
Policy Checks on United States and Foreign Arbitration: Arbitration Out of
Control?, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1661, 1686 (1991).
168. Okeke, supra note 6, at 44–45, (citing Lee D. Neumann, Limiting Judicial Review in International Commercial Arbitration: The New Swiss and
Belgian Laws Offer Less Than They Promise, 1 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 435, 442–
47 (1991)).
169. Id. at 45.
170. Id.
171. Neumann, supra note 168, at 447.
172. Okeke, supra note 6, at 45.
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cial review of the award at the arbitral situs, but does not mandate such a review.173
Thus, an arbitral award is binding under the New York Convention even if review is precluded at the situs of the arbitration.174 Some commentators have argued that, while limiting
the scope of review may be a desirable method of ensuring the
finality of the arbitral process, eliminating review altogether, as
in this case, may be a troublesome proposition.175 The fear expressed is that such provisions may transform the arbitration
process into an arbitrary proposition, thus deterring business
actors from opting for it as a means of effective dispute resolution.176 The statute forces parties to seek judicial review during
enforcement proceedings, which generally happen in the country of one of the parties, thus raising the possibility of bias and
subverting one of the main advantages of international arbitration, neutrality of the forum.177 By completely precluding the
power of its courts to review the types of awards described
above, Belgium has effectively barred any possibility of expanded judicial review. The most troubling aspect of preclusion
of judicial review at situs of arbitration is that it does not result
from the choice of the parties to the arbitration, but rather it is
imposed by the legislature.
F. Switzerland
Similar to the U.K. and France, Switzerland is a very popular
situs for arbitration proceedings because Swiss law grants the
parties “almost complete autonomy in selecting arbitrators,
choosing applicable law, and determining rules for the arbitral
procedure.”178 With respect to judicial review of foreign arbitral
awards, Switzerland adopted legislation that is different from
the laws applicable to its domestic disputes, when it enacted
173. See New York Convention, supra note 3, Art. V(1)(e); Neumann, supra
note 168, at 448. See also Sever, supra note 167, at 1661, 1690.
174. William W. Park, National Law and Commercial Justice: Safeguarding
Procedural Integrity in International Arbitration, 63 TUL. L. REV. 647, 707
(1989) (“The place of the arbitration gives the arbitrator’s decision a presumptive validity in any of the countries that have ratified the Convention.”).
175. Okeke, supra note 6, at 45.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. SMIT & PECHOTA, supra note 142, at SWI A–1.
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Chapter 12 of the Swiss Private International Law Act, entitled
“International Arbitration.”179 The provisions enacted in Chapter 12 are very similar to previously mentioned legislative
frameworks, but are of a more moderate vintage. Article 190
lists the exclusive grounds for non–recognition of an award.
However, Article 192 of the same law expressly allows parties
to agree whether or not to exclude any means of recourse
against the award, or to limit their recourse to one of the
grounds of Article 190.180 It is important to mention that Article
192 applies only to instances where none of the parties to the
arbitration has its domicile, residence, or principal place of
business in Switzerland.181
Thus, Article 190 of the Swiss law seems similar to the
French law on judicial review of awards, allowing it only in a
limited and specific number of situations. The provisions of Article 192, granting parties the option of foreclosing review almost entirely, seems to reflect a policy similar to the one advanced by the Belgian parliament. Thus, while a more restrictive form of review is available to parties to arbitration under
Swiss law, expansion of judicial review is also seemingly unavailable.
IV. ANALYSIS
The validity of contractual expansion of judicial review remains to be settled by the United States Supreme Court, if and
when the Court chooses to address it. In the meantime, this
Note has attempted to illustrate the results achieved by the
various U.S. districts and several foreign jurisdictions in reviewing the issue. The U.S. cases present the two main trains
of thought. The first, the so–called institutional integrity approach, is illustrated by the Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Ninth
Circuit decisions, which categorically deny parties to arbitration
the ability to contractually influence court review of arbitration
awards. The two main arguments advanced in support of this
proposition, as illustrated above, are the concerns regarding
subject matter jurisdiction, as a practical matter, and the integrity of the judicial process, as a policy argument. The second
179. Id. at SWI B(1)–1.
180. Franc, supra note 150, at 221.
181. Id. at 222.
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school of thought on the issue, and the one this author believes
to be more consistent with the pro–arbitration legislative bias,
is the freedom of contract model. This approach is reflected in
the decisions of the Third, Fourth and Fifth Circuits, and embraces expanded review when it reflects the will of the parties.
This section will first discuss the debate between the two models adopted by the courts, and analyze the competing public policy interests at play. This section will subsequently review the
often–advanced debate over the jurisdiction of federal courts.
Finally, this section will turn to the international implications
of expanded review, and offer some conclusions.
A. Institutional Integrity vs. Freedom of Contract
1. The Institutional Integrity Argument
The Institutional Integrity Argument is perhaps the argument most often advanced in supporting a denial of expanded
judicial review. It comes as no surprise that institutional integrity and freedom of contract collide quite frequently when analyzing contractual provisions allowing for expanded judicial review. After all, the two models emphasize completely different
aspects of arbitrated disputes, and, again not surprisingly, arrive at diametrically opposed conclusions. Thus, a pre–dispute
arbitration agreement providing for expanded judicial review
would likely be enforced according to its terms in the Third,182
Fourth,183 Fifth184 Circuits, but would be denied the same treatment if enforcement was sought in the Ninth,185 Seventh,186
Eighth,187 and Tenth Circuits.188 As for the remaining Circuits,
the outcome is truly unpredictable.189
182. Roadway Packaging Sys. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287 (3d Cir. 2001).
183. Syncor Int’l Corp. v. McLeland, 120 F.3d 262, 1997 WL 452245 (4th
Cir. 1997).
184. Gateway Tech., Inc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir.
1995).
185. LaPine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 2003 WL 22025130 (9th
Cir. 2003).
186. Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 935
F.2d 1501 (7th Cir. 1991).
187. UHC Mgmt. Co., Inc., v. Computer Sci. Corp., 148 F.3d 992 (8th Cir.
1998).
188. Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2001).
189. See Hamlin, supra note 148, at 54.

File: DanMacro.doc

350

Created on: 10/19/2003 8:41 PM

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

Last Printed: 11/17/2003 5:36 PM

[Vol. 29:1

The argument regarding arbitral and institutional integrity
has been advanced with vigor by a number of scholars and
while its tenets are admittedly nebulous, the key element seems
to be freedom of the adjudicatory forum from external forces
that may affect the authority of the adjudicator and the impartiality of the process.190 With respect to arbitral institutions, the
argument is the need to shield against undue interference by
the judiciary.191 In the case of the courts, institutional integrity
presumably dictates that the courts “neither be captured by majoritarian forces nor by the whims of particular litigants, who
are ill–positioned to protect the interests of the federal judiciary.”192 The arguments in favor of denying expanded review
based on this precept can effectively be reduced to a select few,
which will be discussed in turn.
First, scholars and practitioners who embrace this viewpoint
have argued that a distinction must be drawn between the parties’ ability to influence the arbitral process, and their ability to
prescribe the conduct of reviewing courts.193 In other words, the
freedom of parties to set the ground rules in arbitration does
not extend beyond the arbitral process itself. The proponents of
this argument rely on the absence of any specific language to
the contrary in the Supreme Court cases discussing arbitration,
as well as on the particularity with which the statutes describe
judicial scope of review. Specifically, they discuss the fact that
the extensive freedom to shape arbitral procedure has never
been held to explicitly apply to the ulterior judicial review.194
Rather, they claim that the limited judicial review provided by
statute is an indication of the defined and limited role the
courts are intended to play in the arbitration arena, notwithstanding any contrary understanding of the parties.

190. Victoria L. C. Holstein, Co–Opting the Federal Judiciary: Contractual
Expansion of Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 12 WORLD ARB. & MED. REP.
276 (2001).
191. Id. at 279 (citing Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 681
(7th Cir. 1983)).
192. Id. at 279 (citing Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478
U.S. 833, 850 (1986)).
193. See UHC Management, 148 F.3d at 997 (1997); Bowen, 254 F.3d at 934;
LaPine Tech., 130 F.3d at 891; Chicago Typogr., 935 F.2d at 1504.
194. See Smit, supra note 49, at 151.
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However, the statutes are just as susceptible to interpretation
as default rules, which can be replaced or eliminated by private
agreements of the parties.195 The latter interpretation can be
derived from the same statutory and common law scheme on
which the proponents of the judicial integrity model rely. The
absence of any specific statutory or case language to the contrary opens the door just as widely for a “default rules” approach.196 When approached through this prism, the statutory
scheme creates a rebuttable presumption, susceptible to
change, and which “grants the ultimate power of decision–
making to the parties.”197 In support of this interpretation, one
might turn, as Professor Rau has, to the similar provision in the
English Arbitration Act, which allows parties to appeal questions of law without leave of the court, if they have so agreed.198
When examined from a purely domestic viewpoint, this issue is
clearly not resolved by the statute because there is no explicit
language on the issue in the FAA. Consequently, the underlying policy objectives of the statute must be taken into account in
suggesting a solution. This is precisely what Professor Cole did,
and her conclusion finds the default rule scheme to be the preferable alternative, due to the significance of the pro–arbitration
freedom of contract policy.199 In her Article, Professor Cole holds
that the legislature likely intended to simply codify what they
perceived to be the consensus regarding judicial review at the
time, without contemplating that parties might be interested in
expanding review.200 Thus, the statute does not address expansion of judicial review at all, and arguments both in favor of and
against expanded review have been founded on this apparent
loophole. However, as Prof. Cole rightly points out, the default
rule approach which would allow parties a greater degree of
195. This opinion was adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Gateway Tech., Inc. v.
MCI Telecomm. Corp., 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995).
196. Alan S. Rau, Contracting Out of the Arbitration Act, 8 AM. REV. INT’L
ARB. 225, 231 (1997).
197. Id.
198. Id at n.33.
199. Sarah R. Cole, Managerial Litigants? The Overlooked Problem of Party
Autonomy in Dispute Resolution, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1199, 1258 (2000) (stating
that interpreting the statute as a default scheme is preferable “given the importance of freedom of contract and the presumption in favor of finding that
the FAA creates a set of default rules.”).
200. Id. at 1254.
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authority in setting the terms of the arbitration, seems to be
more in tune with the past and current policies regarding arbitration.
Second, proponents of the institutional integrity argument
advance the notion that expanded judicial review would in fact
be a wasteful allocation of judicial resources. As one commentator stated, the extent to which a court reviews a decision made
by an adjudicatory body is a function of a judgment as to the
extent to which judicial resources should be made available for
this purpose.201 In making this decision, Professor Smit continues, the body politic considers the interests of the parties with
respect to the type of review they wish to have. Ultimately,
however, the decision is up to the body politic not the parties,
and an agreement by the parties on that question is irrelevant
because the parties have no authority to determine how public
resources are to be spent.202 While the rationale behind this argument is conceptually very elegant, the argument still does not
resolve the issue, because it departs from a flawed premise.
The premise for Professor Smit’s argument is the assumption
that society or the body politic have a choice in the matter, and
can therefore opt not to allocate judicial resources. Upon closer
scrutiny, this premise turns out to be unfounded.
It is, in this author’s opinion, beyond argument that parties
have a right to resort to the judicial system to resolve their civil
disputes. It is equally clear that this right entitles them to either pursue an action in the court system in the form of litigation, or, where the option is available,203 to circumvent the judicial system and engage in arbitration in order to resolve their
disputes. Furthermore, it has been conceded by institutional
integrity advocates that arbitration, even in a form which permits expanded review, saves judicial resources, because the
burden on the reviewing court is much smaller than that of a
201. See Smit, supra note 49, at 150.
202. Id.
203. There are hardly any areas of the law where arbitration is not available as a means of adjudication. See Kenneth M. Curtin, Judicial Review of
Arbitral Awards, 55 DISP. RESOL. J. 57 (2001) (discussing cases in which the
Supreme Court has sanctioned arbitration as a means of dispute resolution
where the subject matter of the dispute implicated fundamental issues of public policy, such as securities violations, RICO claims, anti–trust causes of action, employment discrimination and civil rights cases.)
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full trial.204 In sum, since recourse to the civil courts is a matter
of right, and arbitration, even with expanded judicial review,
serves to conserve judicial resources, it follows that individuals
are entitled to engage in such arbitration because by their actions they would impose a lesser burden on judicial resources.
Third, proponents of the institutional integrity model argue
that expanded judicial review would work against some of the
very attributes making arbitration a viable and desirable alternative to litigation, namely finality, speed and cost–
effectiveness.205 Consequently they propose that upon expanding judicial review arbitration will become merely a form of first
instance adjudication. The wide opportunity for review will be
abused by the parties, the argument continues, and one–step
adjudications will be transformed into four–step adjudications.206
The possibility that expanded review will have the effect of
prolonging proceedings in the manner described above can not
be disputed in good faith. However, proponents of this argument fail to address one detail which, in this case, completely
changes the perspective, namely that the parties have agreed to
this expanded form of judicial review. Therefore, the argument
that the arbitral process is no longer as advantageous does not
withstand scrutiny. Clearly, all parties to an arbitration who
have even a modicum of sophistication realize that the effect of
expanding judicial review is to potentially prolong the dispute
resolution process. However, the extension of these proceedings
is but one factor in the wide array of considerations parties take
into account at the time of negotiating the agreement, and thus
their choice to forego a speedy and final arbitration should not
be underestimated or dismissed as perfunctory by outsiders unfamiliar with all aspects of the dispute. A further argument
could be made that the lack of court deference to the parties’
wishes might, while preserving the finality and efficiency of ar204. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 936 n.6 (“We recognize, of course, that even under
expanded standards of review, arbitration reduces the burden on the district
courts....Reviewing an arbitration award is certainly less work than hearing
the entire case pursuant to diversity or federal question jurisdiction.”).
205. See Smit, supra note 49, at 151.
206. Id. (discussing the possibility that awards would be reviewed by courts
of first instance, then subjected to review by appellate courts, and finally by
the courts of highest instance).
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bitration, cause an even greater disservice to the institution of
arbitration. The Supreme Court has clearly recognized that
when engaging in arbitration the parties give up some of the
security of in–court procedures in favor of a dispute resolution
process tailored to their desires.207 Efficiency and finality are
the byproducts of such tailor–made processes. It stands to reason that such degrees of finality and efficiency are desirable
effects only if the parties actually want them to occur. If parties
do not desire this, they should be able to opt for a more elaborate process. If the courts preclude their ability to opt for a
process with more extensive judicial review, parties might think
twice before relinquishing the procedural safeguards of litigation. Since the promotion of arbitration is clearly established
federal policy, it is easy to recognize how court imposition of
strict review standards might violate the interests promoted by
this policy.
Finally, some commentators have argued that expanded review is socially undesirable. They argue that arbitration implies decision making by arbitrators specifically selected for
their expertise in a particular field, in a manner which might
not necessarily meet with approval in the lower courts because
arbitrators are free to stray from the rigors of the law in rendering awards.208 In other words, having experts decide arbitrable
disputes is of paramount importance to society, and their ability
to fashion creative solutions which best address the presented
problems in the interest of the common good should not be limited by the constraints of applicable law.209 This proposition is
largely true, but with one important distinction. It is indisputable that the arbitration process gives experts a needed voice,
and that having them render decisions advances the state of the
law for all of us. However, if courts are reduced to the function
of merely enforcing or denying arbitral awards, without an op207. See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995)
(stating that parties have the right to a judicial decision on the merits, but
“where the party has agreed to arbitrate, he or she, in effect, has relinquished
much of that right’s practical value”). See also Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473
U.S. at 628 (holding that when agreeing to arbitrate, a party “trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality and expedition of arbitration”).
208. See Smit, supra note 49, at 151–52.
209. Id. at 152.
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portunity to discuss the reasoning for the arbitral decision, the
advancement of the law is stalled, as arbitral decisions carry no
precedential value.210 Thus, expansion of judicial review gives
the courts of first instance the opportunity to establish a record,
and to include the reasoning of expert arbitrators into the body
of the law in the form of written decisions. This procedure better advances the state of the law and facilitates the necessary
beneficial input from experts in the field.
2. Freedom of Contract
The Freedom of Contract, or party autonomy, viewpoint is a
lot more concise by comparison, and much more direct. It maintains the ability of participants in arbitration proceedings to
negotiate and agree upon the manner in which these proceedings will unfold, setting the time, place, procedure, etc. Proponents of this approach further hold that an integral part of the
parties’ ability to determine the structure and form of the dispute resolution process is the scope of judicial review. Thus, the
argument goes, without a mutually agreeable judicial review of
the arbitral decision, the power to define the arbitral process is
meaningless.
This argument flows naturally, given the unequivocally contractual nature of the arbitration process.211 As one commentator noted, “heightened judicial oversight of arbitration awards
finds support in the philosophical underpinnings of contract
law.”212 The reason advanced for this proposition goes to the
very core of fundamental property rights, namely that the right
210. See GARNETT ET AL., supra note 67, at 14 n.31.
Confidentiality...has had a negative impact on the development of
standardization of commercial practices. Confidentiality prevents the
dissemination of rulings and reasons, and because arbitration awards
do not lead to any official precedent or newly established legal principle, it may remove a highly valued feature underlying commercial relationships, namely certainty and consistency.
Id.
211. LEONARD RISKIN & JAMES WESTERBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND
LAWYERS 228 (2d ed. 1998) (“Arbitration is a contractual process. With few
exceptions, parties arbitrate because they have agreed to do so, either in a
contract entered into before the dispute arose or in an ad hoc agreement after
the dispute arose.”).
212. See Davis, supra note 94, at 130.
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to enter into contracts is derived from the individual’s fundamental right to own property.213 It stands to reason that without the freedom to dispose of property in the way one sees fit,
the right to property ownership itself becomes meaningless.214
In a society which holds the right to property ownership in such
high regard, it is difficult to find a reason to justify the interference of the government, even in its incarnation as the judicial
branch, with the express will of the owner in disposing of his or
her property. At a very basic level, the expression of individual
desires as to the disposition of property takes the form of freely
negotiated agreements among property owners.215 Thus, inasmuch as arbitration is fundamentally a creature of contract,
and contracts are the result of property ownership rights, the
conclusion can be drawn that property ownership rights give
rise to the arbitral resolution of disputes. This conclusion is not
necessarily novel, but its application to the issue of expanded
judicial review has some significant implications.
Since it is the right to freely dispose of property that gives
rise to agreements to arbitrate, it becomes increasingly difficult
to argue that the judicial branch should refuse to give due
course to some of these wishes, i.e., expanded judicial review.
Nevertheless, some argue that expanded review of arbitral
213. Id., citing Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1715 (1976) (“the rationale for contract law is
derivative from that of property ... [because] one who breaches deprives the
promisee in a sense no less real than the thief”).
214. Id., citing JOHN LOCKE, TWO THEORIES OF GOVERNMENT, 287 (Peter Laslett ed., 2d ed. 1967), reprinting JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF
GOVERNMENT: AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTENT, AND END OF
CIVIL GOVERNMENT (3d ed. 1698). (“All Men are naturally in...a State of perfect Freedom, to...dispose of their Possessions as they see fit...Property rights
are worthless unless the owner may dispose of his property without governmental interference. Otherwise, all free and voluntary Contracts cease, and
are void, in the World...and all the Grants and Promises of man in power, are
but Mockery and Collusion.”).
215. Id. at 130 n.435, (discussing the Kantian interpretation of societal Justice as an aggregate of free wills freely joined [in contract]: “Justice is therefore the aggregate of those conditions under which the will of one person can
be conjoined with the will of another in accordance with a universal law of
freedom”; IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 34 (John
Ladd trans., 1965) (1797)). See also Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract,
46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 559 (1933) (“free contract assures the greatest amount
of liberty for all”).
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awards alters the very features that confer upon arbitration its
most fundamental advantages: expeditiousness, cost–effectiveness, etc. The reasoning behind this assertion is that the limited,
statutorily prescribed, judicial review is what assures the binding nature and unequivocal enforcement of arbitral awards.
Hence, subjecting these awards to the scrutiny of the courts
would undermine the character of the awards, thus negating
the advantages of the entire arbitration process, and transforming it into an imperfect precursor to extended litigation. These
worries, however, are sorely misplaced.
First, the previously narrow scope of review has not prevented litigators from challenging arbitral awards with gusto.216
Thus, the argument that the current review of arbitral decisions preserves the expeditiousness of arbitration is significantly flawed. Second, because arbitration is a contractual endeavor, the courts would do more to promote arbitration if they
were to heed the parties’ instructions as expressed in their contracts, rather than impose a heavy–handed reading of the applicable statutes. This way, parties could be assured that not only
the arbitral tribunal, but also the reviewing courts, would take
their concerns into account and heed their directives. This outcome would encourage more parties to submit their disputes to
arbitration, lightening the case load of the courts. Third, those
who argue that the benefits of arbitration ought to be protected
in spite of the desires of those who would submit to arbitration,
make a fundamental mistake as to the character of arbitration
itself. It is true that expeditiousness and cost–effectiveness are
significant attractive features of arbitration.217 However, most
parties submit to arbitration in order to resolve disputes according to their wishes in an extra–judicial framework.218 Speed and
216. Richard S. Bayer & Harlan S. Abrahams, The Trouble With Arbitration, 1985 LITIG. J. 30 (1985).
217. See Davis, supra note 94, at 51.
218. Id.
The central element of arbitration is the intention of the parties as
expressed in the arbitration agreement. The agreement determines
the process. Informality may flow from the agreement, but it need
not, for the parties may insist to adhere to arcane rules of evidence or
on wearing powdered wigs during the hearing. Privacy may flow
from the agreement, but it need not, for the parties may broadcast
the proceedings on public access television.
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lesser costs are the effects of choosing private tribunals, but
they are not necessarily ends in themselves. They are desirable
attributes, to be sure, but their desirability does not fundamentally carry the load of the argument against expanded review.
Also, expanded review does not completely do away with the
speed of arbitration, but instead lessens the distance on the expeditiousness spectrum, between full–blown litigation and non–
reviewable arbitration. Furthermore, other important advantages of arbitration, such as confidentiality of the proceedings,
remain in force even if expanded review is allowed. Thus, in
this author’s opinion, while expanded review may somewhat
prolong the dispute resolution process, it confers other significant advantages upon the parties, such as increased certainty
that awards would conform with the applicable law and principles of justice and equity.
Yet another advantage may be that such review could force
arbitrators to approach their positions as decision-makers with
more seriousness, and to weigh the matters to be decided more
carefully, because they would be fully aware of the specter of
judicial review. These advantages are not negligible to participants in international commerce. Therefore, if the courts forced
parties to choose between two very narrow alternatives, full–
blown litigation, or arbitration with almost no judicial review, it
would likely cause great harm to the arbitral institution. After
all, the more the dispute resolution processes reflect the wishes
of the parties, the more likely the parties are to choose them
over litigation. Finally, it is worth reiterating that expanded
review exists in such scenarios because it represents the express wish of the parties to the arbitration agreement. Thus, as
a matter of common sense, denying parties the opportunity to
have their wishes respected would do more to push the arbitration process towards the rigorous and inflexible nature of litigation, instead of the expanded review which the parties desire.
Another interesting point is raised by the arguments of some
institutional integrity advocates who point to the tradition of
limited review expressed in U.S. statutes and international
convention as proof positive of the desirability of denying expanded review. As Professor Rau aptly notes, this argument
merely begs the question to be asked of any long–standing traId.
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dition which potentially impedes development and achievement
of the greater good, why?219 The answer Professor Rau cites to
this question is that the legislature had intended to “insulate
from parochial or intrusive judicial review awards that the parties intended in the usual sense to be binding.”220 However, this
is not the end of the inquiry, and the question must be asked
again why? The logical answer is that the “primary impetus...
was precisely to encourage resort to arbitration by creating a
safe harbor for the results of a contractually-agreed process.”221
Following the argument to its logical endpoint, the result is
clear: the rationale for restricted review falls apart when the
parties to arbitration want to do away with this protection of
the statute and opt for expanded review.222 The public policy
considerations expressed by the Supreme Court in connection
with expanded review support the freedom of contract approach.
B. Public Policy Debate
The importance of the policy favoring enforcement of arbitration clauses, especially in international arbitration, was unequivocally reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in the Mitsubishi
Motors vs. Soler Chryler–Plymouth decision.223 In that decision
219. Allan S. Rau, “Arbitrability” and Judicial Review: A Brief Rejoinder, 13
WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 71, 72 (2002).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. In the words of Justice Blackmun,
The Bremen and Scherk establish a strong presumption in favor of
enforcement of freely negotiated contractual choice–of–forum provisions. Here, as in Scherk, that presumption is reinforced by the emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution. And at
least since this Nation=s accession in 1970 to the [New York] Convention, and the implementation of the Convention in the same year
by amendment of the Federal Arbitration Act, that federal policy applies with special force in the field of international commerce.
Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 620 (1985). See
generally Vimar Seguros Y Raseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky (REEFER), 515 U.S.
528 (1995); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth, Inc., 490 U.S.
477 (1988) (discussing the “current strong endorsement of the federal statutes
favoring [arbitral] method of resolving disputes”); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp.
v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1982) (noting a “liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements”).
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the Court had relied on its previous language to reiterate the
pro–arbitration bias to be applied by the U.S. courts in reviewing arbitral awards. In Bremen v. Zapata Off–Shore Co. the
Court stated that “the expansion of American business and industry will hardly be encouraged, if, notwithstanding solemn
contracts, we insist on a parochial concept that all disputes
must be resolved under our laws and in our courts.”224 This
strong bias, reaffirmed in the Mitsubishi case, was reiterated by
the Supreme Court in its decision in Vimar Seguros, where the
Court announced that “if the United States is to be able to gain
the benefits of international accords and have a role as a
trusted partner in multilateral endeavors, its courts should be
most cautious before interpreting domestic legislation in such
manner as to violate international agreements.”225 The Court
went on to warn U.S. courts that skepticism regarding the competence of foreign arbitrators “must give way to contemporary
principles of international comity and commercial practice.”226
Justice Stevens’ dissent in Vimar Seguros brought up an interesting point, namely that submitting disputes to independent and separate fora for dispute resolution might result in a
lack of uniformity which could interfere with international
trade by increasing the level of uncertainty.227 While this is a
valid concern, most important for the purpose of our discussion
is the fact that the Supreme Court, in a seven to one decision
overwhelmingly chose to ignore the concerns raised by Justice
Stevens in favor of a liberal, freedom of contract approach to
arbitration. The Court clearly opted to disregard potential uncertainty as to the outcome of disputes in favor of the certainty
that the parties’ wishes, as expressed in the freely negotiated
terms of the contract, would be respected by national courts.
The lesson to be drawn is that in reviewing arbitral awards the
terms of the contract should take precedence over any considerations of expeditiousness, judicial economy, or any other advantages which arbitration in its purest form might bring to the
gamut of methods of dispute resolution. Thus, judging by the
language in the Supreme Court’s previous decisions, if the
224.
225.
226.
227.

M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off–Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972).
Vimar Seguros, 515 U.S. 528, 539 (1995).
Id.
Id. at 542.
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Court were to address the issue in the future, it would most
likely endorse expanded judicial review of arbitral awards.
It is important to note that the appellate court cases discussed above all involved domestic arbitrations, or awards
sought to be enforced under the domestic federal arbitration
law.228 Thus, in none of these cases have the courts had the opportunity to consider the implications of expanded judicial review on an award sought to be enforced under the New York
Convention. Nevertheless, the domestic decisions provide us
with important clues as to the potential outcomes of such cases.
The current domestic arbitration law reflects a very strong pro–
arbitration bias on the part of the legislature and the federal
courts. This bias applies with particular force in the international context. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that in
situations involving international awards, the U.S. courts
would be even more likely to respect the wishes of the parties,
as expressed in freely negotiated arbitration agreements.
C. Jurisdiction
One of the main arguments of the Seventh Circuit in Chicago
Typographical, and of institutional integrity advocates in general, in opposing expanded review is the viewpoint that the
agreement of the parties attempted to create federal jurisdiction.229 Presumably, what the Seventh Circuit meant by “jurisdiction” in Chicago Typographical was not the classical interpretation given to the expression by the federal courts, because
the Seventh Circuit had clearly recognized that federal subject
matter jurisdiction existed in that case due to federal question.230 Rather, what Judge Posner likely meant was that the
parties could not contract to enlarge the scope of review set
forth by the statute within the exclusive parameters of the
court’s jurisdiction to review arbitral awards. In Judge Posner’s
opinion, such a course of action was legally unacceptable because “federal courts do not review the soundness of arbitration
228. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (1994).
229. Chicago Typographical, 935 F.2d at 1501 (1991).
230. Id. at 1503. (“The basis of federal jurisdiction was section 301 of the
Taft–Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, which creates federal jurisdiction over suits
to enforce labor contracts. There is no doubt of the applicability of section
301.”).
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awards, [and] an agreement to submit a dispute...to arbitration
is a contractual commitment to abide by the arbitrator’s interpretation.”231
It is clearly the case that an alternative source of subject
matter jurisdiction is always necessary in cases where parties
seek to enforce domestic awards under Chapter I of the FAA.
There is ample precedent on the issue, which indicates that
Chapter I of Title Nine of the U.S. Code does not by itself act as
a source of federal subject matter jurisdiction. This issue was
resolved by a footnote in the United States Supreme Court decision in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corporation.232 The Moses holding has not been revisited by
the Court, and therefore constitutes valid precedent.233 It is also
undisputed that a federal court would have subject matter jurisdiction to decide a dispute if the parties can establish that
federal question jurisdiction arises.234 However, as the Second
Circuit noted, “simply raising a federal issue in a complaint will
not automatically confer federal question jurisdiction.”235
231. Id. at 1504–05.
232. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460
U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983). In relevant part, the footnote provides:
The Arbitration Act is something of an anomaly in the field of federal
court jurisdiction. It creates a body of federal substantive law establishing and regulating the duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate,
yet it does not create any independent federal question jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. 1331 [granting jurisdiction over all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States] or
otherwise. Section 4 provides for an order compelling arbitration
only when the federal district court would have jurisdiction over a
suit on the underlying dispute; hence, there must be diversity of citizenship or some other independent basis for federal jurisdiction before the order can issue.
Id.
233. See e.g. Perpetual Securities, Inc. v. Tang & Hua Yu Chen, 290 F.3d
132, 136 (2nd Cir. 2002), aff’g US v. Am. Soc. of Composers, Authors &
Publishers, 32 F.3d 727, 731 (2nd Cir. 1994); International Insurance
Company v. Caja Nacional de Ahorro y Seguro, 293 F.3d 392, 395 (7th Cir.
2002) aff’g Jain v. de Mere, 51 F.3d 686, 688 (7th Cir. 1995).
234. Federal jurisdiction exists where a well–pleaded complaint “establishes
either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right
to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal
law.” Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S.
1, 27–28 (1983).
235. See Perpetual Securities, 290 F.3d at 136.
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Nevertheless, while Chapter I of Title Nine does not create
subject matter jurisdiction, the situation is quite different in the
case of international awards sought to be enforced under the
New York Convention.236 With respect to foreign arbitral
awards, the New York Convention is the law applicable to the
review and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Thus, the
New York Convention constitutes the definitive document with
respect to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, and plays
an important role in the jurisdiction analysis because the New
York Convention, as enacted by Chapter II of Title Nine, explicitly confers subject matter jurisdiction on the federal courts.237
In relevant part, Section 203 provides that “an action or proceeding falling under the [New York] Convention shall be
deemed to arise under the laws and treaties of the United
States. The district courts of the United States...shall have
original jurisdiction over such an action or proceeding, regardless of the amount in controversy.”238 Section 202 explains the
issue further, defining which actions or awards fall under the
New York Convention:
An arbitration agreement or arbitral award arising out of a legal relationship...which is considered as commercial...falls under the Convention. An agreement...which is entirely between
citizens of the United States shall be deemed not to fall under
the Convention unless that relationship involves property located abroad, envisages performance or enforcement abroad,

236. It is important when discussing the lack of federal court subject matter
jurisdiction under the FAA, that the reader only consider Chapter I of Title
Nine of the United States Code. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16. Although at times the
“FAA” designation has often been applied to all of Title Nine, federal appellate
courts have generally used the designation to refer only to Chapter I of that
title. (See e.g. International Insurance Company v. Caja Nacional de Ahorro y
Seguro, 293 F.3d 392, 395 (7th Cir. 2002); Beiser v. Weyler, et. al., 284 F.3d
665, 666 (5th Cir. 2002); Daihatsu Motor Co. Ltd. v. Terrain Vehicles, Inc. 13
F.3d 196, 198 (7th Cir. 1993). But see Jain v. Mere, 51 F.3d 686, 688–689 (7th
Cir. 1995) (referring to Convention implementing legislation as “Chapter 2” of
the FAA); Republic of Nicaragua v. Standard Fruit Co., 937 F.2d 469, 478,
n.13 (9th Cir. 1991)). Therefore, for purposes of this Note’s discussion of subject matter jurisdiction, this author will assume that the “FAA” denomination
refers only to Chapter I of Title Nine. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (1994).
237. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–208 (1994).
238. 9 U.S.C. § 203 (1994).
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or has some other reasonable relation with one or more foreign
states.239

Finally, Section 208 establishes the relationship between Chapter I of Title Nine and the New York Convention, namely that
Chapter I provides the gap–filler provisions in case the respective issue is not covered by the Convention.240 Pursuant to the
clear statutory language, the existence of federal subject matter
jurisdiction in arbitrations involving the New York Convention
has been recognized by the federal courts.241 Hence, while in
arbitrations applying U.S. law and involving only U.S. parties,
the FAA or state arbitration statutes may apply, all other arbitral awards can be enforced pursuant to the New York Convention, thus conferring subject matter jurisdiction on the federal
courts. Thus, when it comes to awards rendered or sought to be
enforced under the New York Convention, the explicit grant of
subject matter jurisdiction in Title Nine of the U.S. Code resolves the issue of subject matter jurisdiction conclusively.
However, this explicit grant of subject matter jurisdiction
does not do away with the objection that expanded review attempts to impermissibly enlarge the role of the courts. Like
Chapter I of Title Nine, the New York Convention also contains
a specific list of reasons for which the courts can vacate or modify awards, in Article V.242 Thus, if the parties were to contract
for expanded review, the jurisdiction of the courts would, in the
view of judicial integrity advocates, be confined only to the pro239. 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1994).
240. See 9 U.S.C. § 208 (1994). (“Chapter I applies to actions and proceedings brought under this chapter to the extent that chapter is not in conflict
with this chapter or the [New York] Convention as ratified by the United
States.”).
241. See Base Metal Trading v. OJSC et al., 283 F.3d 208, 212 (4th Cir.
2002) (“the Convention and its implementing legislation...give federal district
courts original jurisdiction over actions to compel or confirm foreign arbitral
awards”); Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284
F.3d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Convention Provides Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Glencore Grain’s Action To Enforce Its Arbitral Award”); Trans
Chemical Limited v. China National Machinery Import and Export Corp., 161
F.3d 314 (5th Cir. 1998) (affirming the decision of the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of Texas, 978 F. Supp. 266, 292 (S.D. Texas 1997)); Industrial Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshutte GmbH, 141 F.3d 1434,
1440 (11th Cir. 1998); Productos Mercantiles e Industriales v. Faberge USA,
Inc., 23 F.3d 41, 44 (2nd Cir. 1994).
242. See supra, Part I.B.2.
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visions of Article V. In response, freedom of contract proponents could present the same arguments as in the domestic debate with regard to expanded review, illustrated in Part II of
this paper. In cases where the New York Convention is involved, the argument of freedom of contract proponents is
strengthened further by the various U.S. Supreme Court decisions which emphasize the strong policy in favor of enforcement
of arbitral agreements in the international context.243 The previously discussed cases have illustrated the way some of the
federal circuits are likely to respond to a request to expand judicial review in the domestic setting. However, it stands to reason that when asked to do the same in a context involving the
New York Convention, these courts would grant wider deference to the desires of the parties.
D. International Implications
Undoubtedly, in the near future U.S. courts will be asked to
decide whether expansion of judicial review is a viable option in
cases involving enforcement under the New York Convention.
Similar concerns might arise in cases where American parties
seek enforcement of international awards in other jurisdictions,
pursuant to the New York Convention. Interestingly enough,
however, it seems that many jurisdictions have not yet had to
deal with the question at all.244 However, given the legislative
framework in place in many of these jurisdictions, it seems
likely that even when presented with the issue, many would
likely deny the parties’ request for expanded judicial review. In
this regard, it seems that the courts of the U.S., U.K., and the
few other jurisdictions which permit expanded review for domestic arbitrations, have reached a paradoxical impasse. In
granting wide deference to the parties’ freedom of contract, they
would seem to have arrived at a result that is inimical to the
underlying purpose of the New York Convention, which had
attempted to achieve of a high level of homogeneity in the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.245
In this regard, institutional integrity advocates would most
likely argue that such a result would only add to the confusion
243. See supra, Part IV.B.
244. See supra, Part IV.B.
245. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
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and reticence of international commercial actors to engage in
arbitration.246 However, this conclusion would be superficial for
several reasons. The New York Convention was adopted during
a time when international arbitration was developing rapidly
but independently in the various jurisdictions, and thus uniformity in enforcement was of paramount importance if arbitration was to function effectively over jurisdictional lines. Furthermore, at the time many of the jurisdictions were still very
reticent toward enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, and
therefore a list of the acceptable grounds of review provided
much needed clarity and restraint for the national courts. Since
then, however, the situation has changed dramatically. International arbitration has become commonplace and the sophistication of international actors and their counsel has also increased significantly. Furthermore, national courts have become much more adept at recognizing and enforcing international awards. As a result, the uniformity of procedures, which
was of paramount importance in the years preceding the adoption of the New York Convention, is no longer a cardinal consideration, because courts all over the world have come to respect
the institution of arbitration as a viable and just means of dispute resolutions.
The New York Convention’s fundamental goal was the promotion of arbitration as a viable means of resolution of international disputes. Yet the Convention may potentially diminish
the willingness of parties to submit to arbitration if its provisions are enforced without due regard to the primary impetus of
decisions to arbitrate — freedom of contract. It is therefore
very important that the New York Convention remain in place
as a default framework with respect to international arbitration, as a safeguard against potential attempts by governments
or courts to encroach on the arbitral process. However, in situations where the parties explicitly agree to circumscribe the
precepts of the Convention and stipulate for expanded review,
there is no reason why the courts should decline heeding their
wishes.

246. See Vimar, 515 U.S. at 542.
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CONCLUSION
It is uncertain whether the Supreme Court will resolve the
debate over expanded review in the near future. However,
when presented with the issue the Supreme Court will most
likely support the freedom of contract viewpoint and allow for
expanded judicial review. In the past the Supreme Court has
recognized the importance of the public policy protecting the
provisions of agreements to arbitrate, and has therefore granted
parties wide deference in establishing the ground rules for arbitration. This policy is further enhanced in the sphere of international commerce by the Supreme Court’s respectful stance
towards the needs of international commerce, and of the general principles of comity among nations. Therefore, it stands to
reason that the only outcome consistent with the Court’s prior
decisions and the policy interests at play in the debate surrounding international arbitration would be reached by granting the express wishes of the contracting parties and endorsing
expanded judicial review.
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